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ASKING TOO MUCH: AUTONOMY AND
RESPONSIBILITY AT THE END OF LIFE'
Lois Shepherf

Are there no limits to patient autonomy? Sometimes it appears that way,
especially when the issue is one of patient choices regarding life-sustaining
treatment.
I want to examine four circumstances where there should be some limits
to honoring a patient's wishes. The limits I want to discuss are not
operational; they are moral. In other words, the problem is not that we
cannot honor the patient's wishes because we are not sure what they are,
such as might be the case in a dispute among family members, each of which
recounts a different conversation with the patient. Other examples would be
when the living will, as is almost always the case, is too vague to apply or
subject to contrary interpretations or when a person who is attempting to
speak for himself about his wishes is depressed, delusional, or has his
capacity questioned on some other grounds. I want to remove, for the sake
of argument, any of these operational obstacles to honoring the patient's
wishes. In those cases, if we fail to honor the patient's wishes, it is because
we conclude that they are not adequately understood or not legally tidy.
Instead, I am interested in thinking about situations in which we should
not honor the patient's wishes no matter how clear they are. Here are four

such cases worth considering. After discussing them, I will consider what
they have in common.
SUICIDE

A recent incident in England has been touted as the first instance in which
a person used a living will to commit suicide.3 Kerrie Wooltorton poisoned
herself, called an ambulance, and upon arrival at the hospital handed the
1. This article was discussed by the author at The Journal of ContemporaryHealth
Law and Policy's November 11, 2009, Symposium, "The Current State of Bioethics in
America," at The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
2. Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Biomedical Ethics, University of
Virginia. I would like to thank Paul Shepherd, Aline Kalbian, and the editors of The
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy for their helpful comments on prior

drafts of this essay.
3.

Coroner:Doctors Had to Let Woman Die, AOL NEWS, Oct. 1, 2009, http://news.

aol.com/article/coroner-says-doctors-had-to-let-kerrie/697884 (last visited Oct. 9, 2009).
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doctors a letter that refused treatment in the event of her suicide attempt. It
was a perfectly unambiguous declaration of her wishes. The hospital
complied, later explaining that its hands were tied; hospital personnel would
have been violating her rights if they provided her with medical treatment,
even though they believed it could have saved her life. According to news
reports, "Doctors said they feared they would be charged with assault if they
treated her because she had made her wishes
clear. . . ."4 The coroner agreed
5

that the hospital had acted appropriately.
Living wills were never intended to be used as a legally binding measure
by which individuals could refuse or reject rescue during a suicide attempt.
Instead, they were developed as a means to allow patients to reject advanced
medical technologies used to prolong the dying process.
It is true that in debates about the extent to which patient choice in such
matters should be respected, opponents of liberal interpretations of
individual choice have often compared a physician's compliance with
wishes to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment to assisting in a
patient's suicide. But doctors, nurses, administrators, ethicists, judges, and
lawyers involved in these matters now generally accept that respecting
patients' wishes to refuse treatment in the case of terminal illness or
permanent vegetative state does not amount to assisting in their suicide. The
terminally ill do not have the option to continue living; the permanently
vegetative do not have the option of returning to sentient life. Even in other
cases in which treatment is refused, our society has generally reached a
consensus that it is ethical and legal to honor the refusal, and perhaps
unethical and violative of an individual's legal rights to fail to honor it.
Examples of such cases may be when treatment is rejected because of
religious beliefs or because the individual reasonably, on the basis of his or
her own value system, believes that the burdens of the treatment outweigh its
benefits.
In all of these cases our society does not typically think of the patients as
committing suicide. Many professionals have even, at least partially, moved
in the direction of recognizing that those who seek a physician's prescription

4.

Id.

5. Id. It is not clear to me why it mattered that her wishes were put in writing. If
she arrived at the hospital with capacity and refused treatment, why would the same
result not have been obtained? Moreover, a living will, at least in the United States, is
not generally understood to apply, by itself, in an emergent situation. Prior to honoring a
patient's living will and signing an appropriate order-a Do Not Resuscitate (DNR)
order, for example-health care providers must have the opportunity to determine
whether the living will is valid, has not been revoked, and applies to the situation at hand.
This takes some time and exercise of judgment, in contrast to following another doctor's
already executed order (again, like a DNR), that can be followed in emergent situations.
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to hasten death, such as under Oregon's or Washington's statutes permitting
this aid, are not really committing suicide. As terminally ill individuals, they
do not have the option of living much longer; therefore, their motivation is
not to substantially foreshorten their lives but to provide for a more peaceful
and dignified death. 6
But the English incident was a case of suicide as we typically understand
it-as a tragic, often impulsive, and violent act by which a person shortens
his or her own life due to problems with depression, psychological distress,
or another mental health condition that can be treated or managed. The
news reports of this particular case describe this kind of situation-the
woman was twenty-six years old, swallowed anti-freeze, and had been
depressed because of her inability to have a child.7
Kerrie Wooltorton not only committed suicide and refused rescue, she
affirmatively sought the assistance of health care providers to make the
process more comfortable. Her "living will" stated that while she did not
want life-sustaining treatment, she did "want to be comfortable as nobody
wants to die alone and scared." 8
A person's protests cannot stop police or firefighters or other nearby
individuals from trying to rescue her from a suicide attempt of this kind.
Health care providers should not be expected to act any differently.
FUTILE TREATMENT

In 2008 the parents of Motd Brody, a twelve-year old Hasidic Jewish boy,
sought a court ruling that a Washington, D.C. hospital continue to provide
him with ventilator support and other medical treatment. 9 The child had
previously been declared dead under standards for determining brain death,
but his parents protested, stating that this determination violated their

6.

See generally Kathryn L. Tucker & Fred B. Steele, Patient Choice at the End of

Life, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 305 (2007). The American Public Health Association and the

American Academy of Hospice and Palliative Medicine have both adopted policies to
avoid describing these practices as "assisted suicide." Id. at 325.
7.

Coroner:Doctors Had to Let Woman Die, supra note 3.

8.

Id.

9.

N.C. Aizenman & Michael Alison Chandler, N.Y. Boy on Life Support in D.C.

Dies, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 2008, at BOI, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/story/2008/11/17/ST2008111700764.html.
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family's religious beliefs.' 0 Prior to the court's ruling, the child's heart
stopped beating, allowing medical professionals to declare him dead on the
basis of lack of cardio-respiratory function. Cases such as this one-not
common, but not extraordinary either-are commonly understood as
involving a dispute about doctors' and hospitals' obligations to provide
futile treatment.
After years of litigation in which patients were insisting on a right to
refuse treatment against doctors' and hospitals' insistence on providing it,
we have increasingly seen the opposite phenomenon: patients (or rather,
their families or surrogates on the basis of patient wishes) insisting on
treatment against the doctors' and hospitals' refusal to provide it.
The debate about what constitutes futile medical treatment-and who is
allowed to determine if it is futile-is long-standing and far from over. For
example, is it appropriate to consider quality of life assessments or a
calculation of financial costs, so that a life-extending treatment may be
considered futile because the life preserved is of such poor quality or the
treatment is extremely costly? Do physicians and/or ethics committees get
to define futility unilaterally, on an ad hoc basis, or should courts be
involved?
The aim of this paper is not to enter this intricate yet worthwhile debate
about appropriate understandings of futility, but instead to identify limits to
patient autonomy about which we should be able to achieve a fairly wide
consensus. For this reason, I want to be careful to define futility here in a
very narrow sense, although one could argue for a broader definition. There
are two situations about which there appears to be an ethical and legal
consensus that life-sustaining treatment is futile, and that providers should
not be required to provide it: when an individual is brain dead, and when a
proposed treatment simply would not work.1' Neither of these two instances
involves moral judgments about acceptable success rates for a particular
procedure in order for it to be worth undergoing, or about acceptable

10. Brain death, under the D.C. Code, could be determined upon the "irreversible
cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem .. " D.C. CODE §
7-601 (2008). All fifty states recognize that death may be determined using neurological
criteria; alternatively, death may be determined on the basis of the irreversible cessation
of cardio-pulmonary function. See generally Janet L. Dolgin & Lois Shepherd,
BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 840-42 (Aspen Pubs. 2d ed. 2009). New Jersey and New York

provide religious exceptions to the general rule permitting a determination of death on the
basis of neurological criteria. See N.J. STAT. AN. § 26:6A-5 (2007); N.Y. COMP. CODES
& REGS. tit. 10 Health(c) § 400.16(e)(3) (2007).
11.

Thaddeus M. Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally

Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REv. 1, 26-28 (2007).
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outcomes in terms of life quality. Instead, they reflect the idea that health
care providers should not be required to work violence on a body for no
conceivable good end.
HAND FEEDING

A recent article in the American Journal of Bioethics by Thomas I.
Cochrane argues that individuals should be able, through advance directives
or through surrogates making decisions for them, to refuse hand-feeding in
the event of later incapacity.' 2 A living will that specifies wishes of this
kind might resemble that of Dr. William A. Hensel, which was published
over a decade ago in the Journal of the American Medical Association.13
Hensel wrote that if he ever suffered "irreversible central nervous system
damage to the point that [he did] not recognize [his] family," he would
choose physician-assisted death, if it were legal. He continued, "If not, do
not place food or water in my mouth. Instead, place it on my bed table.
If I
14
feed myself, I live another day; if I do not, I will die and that is fine."'
Refusing future hand-feeding may seem like a natural extension of the
idea that individuals who retain decision-making capacity can choose in the
present to forego food or drink so that they may control the circumstances of
their deaths. Philosopher Bernard Gert and medical doctors James Bernat
and Peter Mogielnicki argued over fifteen years ago that competent
chronically and terminally ill patients could take control of their dying
process through patient refusal of hydration and nutrition without having to
"requir[e] physicians to reject the taboos on PAS [physician-assisted suicide]
and VAE [voluntary active euthanasia] that have existed for millennia."1
More recently, Stanley Terman, together with the organization
Caring
6
Advocates, has worked to educate patients about this option.'
There has also been recent, broad acknowledgement that, for many
people, the natural process of dying will suppress appetite and make the

12. See Thomas I. Cochrane, Unnecessary Time Pressures in Refusal of LifeSustaining Therapies: Fearof Missing the Opportunity to Die, 9 AJOB 47 (2009).
13.

See generally William A. Hensel, My Living Will, 275 JAMA 588 (1996).

14.

Id.

15.

James L. Bernat et al., PatientRefusal of Hydration andNutrition, 153 ARCHIVES

OF INTERNAL MED. 2723, 2723 (1993).
16. Stanley A. Terman, THE BEST WAY TO SAY GOODBYE: A LEGAL PEACEFUL
CHOICE AT THE END OF LIFE 280-84 (Life Transitions Pubs. 2007).
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intake of nutrition burdensome. In such cases, force feeding (whether
through a feeding tube or by hand) seems inappropriate and not truly
caring. 7
But Cochrane's argument must be distinguished from these quite
reasonable ways of respecting patients' wishes while still caring for them,
and instead should be understood as the radical suggestion that it is. He is
suggesting that patients who lack present decision-making capacity not be
offered food, food that they might willingly and happily accept. Hensel's
living will, moving and poetic as it is, might be read to mean as much. And
if one might ask not to be offered food by mouth in some future physical or
mental state, what is to prevent one from forbidding a tray of food being left
at the bedside?
Cochrane's motivation for suggesting that individuals, or their surrogates,
might refuse future hand-feeding is rather laudable. He is trying to find a
way out of a practically common but theoretically underexplored dilemma:
how a surrogate should make a decision for or against a therapy that is lifesaving, but carries a high risk of leaving the patient in a condition the
surrogate believes the patient would deem intolerable-with severe
cognitive deficits, for example. If the therapy is extremely successful, the
patient will enjoy substantial time in a condition not much altered from his
original condition. If the outcome is less than ideal (e.g., the therapy is not
successful), the patient may be saved, but severely altered and left in a
condition in which the surrogate believes the patient would wish to refuse
further life-sustaining treatment. The only problem is that sometimes there
is no life-sustaining treatment as we commonly understand it-ventilator,
feeding tube, dialysis-to refuse. Instead, the individual can breathe, eat,
and so on without medical assistance. The "window" in which to refuse
treatment has closed. Cochrane wants to keep that window open longer, to
allow the surrogate to give the suggested medical procedure a try in the hope
of a positive outcome. If the outcome is the one dreaded, then he wants to
be able to undo the decision in effect, to get to the same outcome (death) that
the surrogate would have chosen if he or she had, as if by crystal ball, known
the way things would turn out.
Laudable motivation aside, how can doctors and nurses, or anyone, be
asked to refrain from providing food and water to individuals who presently
want it, who would experience the provision of food and water as
pleasurable and as a form of care, and who would die without it? I do not
think they can be asked to do this. Hensel himself recognizes how much he

17. Lois Shepherd, IF THAT EVER HAPPENS To ME: MAKING LIFE AND DEATH
DECISIONS AFTER TERRI SCHIAVO 148-53 (Univ. of N.C. Press 2009).
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may be asking of others, pleading for
8 them to make "difficult choices" for
which God may grant them courage.'
NON-BURDENSOME TREATMENT FOR PEOPLE WHO BECOME PROFOUNDLY
DISABLED

The fourth situation in which I think limits on patient autonomy should be
recognized is likely to be the most controversial, and I confess I find it
problematic myself. It is illustrated by the 1992 Michigan case of Michael
Martin. 19 In 1987, Martin, a man in his early thirties, suffered devastating
injuries in a vehicular accident. He stabilized into a state of severe physical
and mental disability, where he depended on nursing care, a colostomy, and
a feeding tube to survive. He was conscious, of that there was no doubt,
although there was conflicting evidence on the degree to which he could
interact with other people. In a hearing that would take place several years
after the accident, a number of witnesses, including both lay and medical
expert witnesses, would testify to his ability to nod his head yes or no
appropriately in answer to simple questions and to follow simple commands
with voluntary movements. The trial judge confirmed this assessment by
personally visiting with Mr. Martin. The medical experts agreed that it was
unlikely that Mr. Martin's condition would improve.
Five years after the accident, his wife, who was also his legal guardian,
sought court approval to remove his feeding tube and allow him to die.
Mary Martin did not pursue the removal of her husband's feeding tube on
grounds that it was burdensome or that it would be in his best interests to
remove it. According to a later court opinion, there was no evidence this
was the case.20 Instead, she sought the removal of the feeding tube on the
basis of Michael Martin's autonomy.
Mary Martin provided moving and persuasive testimony about
conversations she and Michael Martin had had prior to his accident. These
conversations centered around his not wanting to live in a state of
dependency. While other witnesses testified that Michael, pre-accident, had
said he would never want to live as a "vegetable," 2' Mary Martin testified

18.

Hensel, supra note 13, at 588.

See also
19. See generally In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d 399 (Mich. 1995).
Conservatorship of Wendland, 28 P.3d 151 (Cal. 2001) (refusing to allow termination of

artificial nutrition and hydration for severely disabled or minimally conscious patient).
20.

In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 409.

21.

Id. at 415 (Levin, J., dissenting).
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that her husband's statements were broad enough to include other
debilitating conditions. According to the Michigan Supreme Court, "She
claimed that he was always bothered by, and intolerant of, people who were
disabled or dependent on others and often stated that he would rather die
than be dependent on people and machines." 22 She supplied evidence of
numerous similar conversations in which Michael indicated that if he "could
23
not be the same person," then he would "not want to live that way."
Memorably, she testified that he had once told her, "Mary, promise me you
wouldn't let me live like that if I can't be the person I am right now, because
if you do, believe me I'll haunt you every day of your life."24
Despite the quite persuasive evidence of Michael Martin's prior wishes,
the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the evidence did not meet the
standard adopted in the case for such situations, which required clear and
convincing evidence of pre-injury statements to refuse treatment under the
specific circumstances that existed.25
I am less convinced by this rationale than by the argument that there are
limits to patient autonomy. The problem presented by this case would not
be solved by the availability of additional, clearer, and better documented
statements made by Michael Martin prior to his accident about the kind of
life he would find intolerable. The fact was that his life was not intolerable.
Rebecca Dresser argues that in cases such as this one, where pre-disability
sentiments conflict with post-disability interests, the post-disability interests
should govern. 26 Her willingness to impose limits on autonomy is justified
by her concern for caring for the present, vulnerable individual. She has
written, "If a patient can no longer appreciate the values that motivated the
precommitment choice [i.e., the preferences set out in the advance directive],
treatment
decisions should take into account what now matters to the
' 27
patient.

22.

Id. at 402.

23.

Id. at 412.

24.

In re Martin, 538 N.W.2d at 412.

25.

Id. at 413.

26. See Rebecca Dresser, Precommitment: A Misguided Strategyfor Securing Death
with Dignity, 81 TEX. L. REv. 1823 (2003).
27.

Id. at 1840 (alteration in original).

80

The Journalof ContemporaryHealth Law andPolicy Vol. XXVI:1

To be clear, the type of situation that I am concerned with is when a
patient's prior wishes indicate a refusal of life-sustaining treatment in a
condition in which the patient is conscious, non-terminal, has some
meaningful interaction with others, and the benefits of treatment and
continued life outweigh their burdens.
The concept of "meaningful
interaction" is left open; it is not important for the argument that its exact
meaning be specified.
Much of the law-both cases and statutes-that requires us to honor a
patient's prior preferences to refuse life-sustaining treatment has been
developed in order to respond to situations in which the individual in
question is terminally ill or in a permanent vegetative state (or is
permanently unconsciousness). 2s Living will statutes, for example, often
permit a person to specify his or her wishes regarding life-sustaining
treatment in these two situations. 29 Similarly, many state statutes grant
immunity from liability for a surrogate's decision to remove life-sustaining
treatment in these two situations, as long as the guidelines in the statute are
followed.3°
We have little law, however, to guide us in the situation when someone is
dependent upon life-sustaining treatment, but is living in a stable,
profoundly disabled state that they had earlier indicated they would wish to
avoid by refusing treatment.
Once Michael Martin stabilized into a condition of profound disability,
with potentially many years of life ahead, he came to resemble a person who
had lived with severe cognitive limitations from birth or a young age. We
do not generally allow family members or others to refuse non-burdensome
life-sustaining treatments (such as antibiotics for pneumonia or another
infection) in these situations.
To do so would be an unacceptable
discrimination against persons on the basis of their disabilities.
This is a substantial reason why removing Michael Martin's feeding tube
on the basis of his autonomy does not seem right. On the surface, honoring

28.

Shepherd, supra note 17, at 135; see, e.g., In the Matter of Quinlan, 355 A.2d

647 (N.J. 1976) (permanent vegetative state); In the Matter of Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209
(N.J. 1989) (terminal condition); Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S.
261 (1990) (permanent vegetative state).

29.

See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE § 2133.02 (2009).

30. David Orentlicher, Mary Ann Bobinski & Mark Hall, Bioethics and Public
Health Law 283 (Aspen Pubs. 2d ed. 2008); Dan Larriviere & Richard Bonnie,
Terminating Artificial Nutrition and Hydration in Persistent Vegetative State Patients:
Current and ProposedState Laws, 66 NEUROLOGY 1624 (2006); see, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 90-322 (2007); FLA. STAT. §§ 765.109, 765.305 (2004) (also including "endstage condition").
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his previous wishes looks much like the good we do when we honor a
terminally ill person's wishes. But we should take a careful look at those
statements that Mary reported Martin as having made prior to the accident.
Can Michael Martin's intolerance of people with disabilities and who are
dependent bind us to treat him in the same way? If removing the feeding
tube from Michael Martin in the absence of his pre-injury statements does
not feel right, how does the presence of those statements-which place his
(and society's) discriminatory attitudes in bold relief-make it better?
REASONABLE LIMITS

What right does Michael Martin have to haunt Mary Martin for being
unable to remove his feeding tube? Or William Hensel to ask his children to
find the courage not to feed him by hand? None. Nor did Kerri Wooltorton
or the family of Mot Brody have a right to the responses they sought from
doctors and hospitals. In each of the four situations presented, what is being
asked of health care providers or surrogates or family-not to attempt rescue
of another person from a blatant suicide attempt, to provide futile treatment
that does nothing more than violence on a body, to refuse food and water to
a person who may want it, and to ignore the needs of a vulnerable individual
because of intolerant views of disability and dependency-is inherently
unreasonable. These demands are unreasonable because they ask people to
deny their basic impulses to treat others humanely for reasons that do not
justify such a request.
Not only do individuals have no right to make such demands, they have a
responsibility not to make them. When we discuss the law and ethics of
end-of-life decision-making, we tend to talk about a patient's autonomy and
others' responsibilities to respect that autonomy. Sometimes-though not
often enough-we talk about other responsibilities that are owed to patients,
like the duty to care for them, to respect their privacy, or to treat them with
dignity. We do not, however, think enough about the responsibilities that
patients owe to others when, capable and in relative health, they sit down to
write a living will or talk with loved ones about wishes regarding life
support. That future patient is each of us. In this role we tend to worry most
about protecting our rights. But we have to be careful that in setting out our
own wishes, we do not ask others to deny their own humane responsibilities.
That is asking too much.

